Clark Wilson LLP Insurance Bulletin
Case Law Review Archive
Overlapping Auto SEF 44 Family Protection (UMP) Endorsements:
BC Supreme Court Rules on Priority and Per-Claimant Limits
In Mazur v. Citadel General Assurance Company, the British
Columbia Supreme Court decided another case involving the
extent to which auto insurers from outside the Province are
compelled to match the minimum insurance coverage required
to be carried by all BC insured drivers. In BC, the minimum
coverage must, in all cases, be purchased from BC’s provincial
auto insurer, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia
(“ICBC”). In the Mazur decision, the Court ruled that the
insurers’ own polices (instead of BC law) dictated which policy
would provide primary or excess coverage. The court also
ruled BC’s Family Compensation Act, which governs fatality
claims, contemplates one global claim by the estate for the
underinsured motorist protection coverage limit, regardless of
the number of beneficiaries.
In Mazur, the judge was asked to decide,
which, if any, of three out-of-province auto insurers
must provide primary coverage under their overlapping
Standard Endorsement Form (“SEF”) 44 Family Protection
Endorsements (which provides Alberta’s version of the
Underinsured Motorist Coverage offered by US insurers); and
whether the limit for the SEF 44 Endorsement was a global
amount for all claims arising out of one fatality or was instead
available for each claimant.
The case concerned the death of Cameron Lougheed in a single
car accident near Fernie, BC in June, 1999. Mr. Lougheed was
riding in a vehicle owned and operated by Jos-Leopold Denis
Gagnon. Both men were Alberta residents.
Mr. Gagon had an auto insurance policy issued in Alberta by the
Co-Operators General Insurance Company with SEF 44 limits of
$500,000. Mr. Lougheed had an auto insurance policy issued in
Alberta by the Citadel General Insurance Company with SEF 44
limits of $1,000,000. Mr. Lougheed’s common-law wife had an
auto insurance policy issued in Alberta by the Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company with SEF 44 limits of $1,000,000.
Co-Operators, Citadel and Liberty were all authorized to carry
on insurance business in British Columbia under BC’s Insurance
Company Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Regulation. Under
that regulation, none of the insurers were permitted to set up
any defence to a BC action they could not use if their policies
had been issued by ICBC within and pursuant to the laws of
British Columbia. In British Columbia, the minimum protections
provided by auto liability policies are set out in the Insurance
(Motor Vehicle) Act and regulations (the “Regulations”). If any
part of Co-Operators, Citadel or Liberty insurance policies
provided less protection than a BC policy, the insurers had to
meet the BC minimum. Any part of their policies which provided
greater protection or did not otherwise conflict with the Act and
Regulations would remain in effect.
Each of the three auto policies contained the following SEF 44
Family Protection Endorsement:
[T]he insurer shall indemnify each eligible claimant for the
amount that such eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover
from an inadequately insured motorist as compensatory
damages in respect of bodily injury or death sustained by an
insured person by accident arising out of the use or operation
of a motor vehicle.
Co-operators exhausted its third party limits settling tort cases
commenced by Mr. Lougheed’s wife, his two children from a
previous marriage and by another passenger in the vehicle.
The wife and children commenced separate actions under the
BC Family Compensation Act against Co-operators, Citadel and
Liberty, seeking to recover additional money under the insurers’
SEF 44 Endorsements. The insurers conceded that all three
policies provided coverage.
Citadel and Liberty argued that the Co-Operators policy was
primary and their policies were excess. They said the SEF 44
clearly dictated the result and was not modified by the BC
Regulations. Clause 7 of the SEF 44 provided,
- Multiple Coverages
Subject to the provisions hereof, where an eligible
claimant is entitled to payment under Family Protection
Coverage under more than one policy and the insured
person
(a) is an occupant of an automobile, such insurance
on the automobile in which the insured person is an
occupant is first loss insurance and any other
insurance is excess;
Co-Operators argued Citadel and Liberty were using SEF 44 as
a defence that would not be available to them if they issued
their policies in BC, and that the SEF 44 endorsement was
modified by the BC Regulations such that none of the policies
was primary. Consequently, Co-operators said coverage must
be apportioned on a pro-rata basis among the three policies,
pursuant to Section 148.1(9) of the Regulations, which states,
Where, in the event of a claim, an insured has access to
underinsured motorist protection coverage or similar insurance
protection under a contract of automobile insurance of another
jurisdiction, the benefits of that coverage are primary and any
benefits provided under this Division are available only to the
extent that the amount of benefits provided by the certificate
exceeds the amount of benefits provided by the primary
insurance.
By operation of this section, underinsured motorist protection
(“UMP”) coverage provided by the Insurance Corporation of
British Columbia (“ICBC”) is excess to any policy available to an
insured issued in another jurisdiction. However, the judge in
the Mazur case concluded section 148.1(9) of the Regulations
did not apply because there was no ICBC coverage at issue.
He said that Citadel and Liberty, by relying on clause 7 of the
SEF 44, were not setting up a defence to claims of the plaintiffs.
Rather, they were relying on Clause 7 only to determine the
scope of their respective obligations to the plaintiffs. This
decision makes sense in the context of the Business
Authorizations issued to the Alberta insurers, which prevent
defences from being raised, rather than “converting” the
policies into BC policies. What Co-Operators was attempting to
do was read the statutory provision into its own policy, which is
not the effect of the Business Authorization. Therefore, while
Citadel and Liberty would not have been allowed to raise their
policy wordings as a defence to a s.148.1(9) claim by ICBC,
they were correct in stating that s.148.1(9) was not available
to Co-Operators. The court therefore correctly ruled that
because there are no provisions in the Regulations dealing with
multiple SEF 44 carriers, the policies issued by the Alberta
carriers governed, making Co-Operators primary. For a related
discussion on this issue, readers are invited to read the December
22, 2004 commentary in the Insurable Interest, in which the BC
Court of Appeal discussed the applicability of s.148.1(9) in the
context of an Alberta resident injured while driving a BC insured
vehicle.
Regarding the limits available to the plaintiffs, the insurers
conceded the SEF 44 limit under their respective policies was
$1 million, matching the BC minimum. They alleged the SEF 44 limit
was the global amount available for all claims and not the limit for
each claim. They argued there was nothing the BC Regulations
conflicting with this. In opposition, the plaintiffs submitted that
section 148.1(1)(c) of the BC Regulations and section 13
schedule 3 of the Regulations combined to dictate that each of
the plaintiffs was entitled to the $1 million limit. Section 148.1(1)(c)
of the Regulations defines an “insured”. It states,
“insured” means
(a) an occupant of a motor vehicle described
in the owner’s certificate;
…
(c) a person who, in the jurisdiction in which
the accident occurred, is entitled to
maintain an action against the under
insured motorist for damages because of
the death of a person described in
paragraph (a) …
and, for the purposes of the payment of compensation under
this Division, includes the personal representative of a deceased
insured;
Section 13 of Schedule 3 of the Regulations provides,
For the purpose of Division (2) of Part 10, the limit of coverage
for underinsured motorist protection is $1 million per insured
person.
The Plaintiffs argued that because each of them was entitled to
seek compensation for the death of Mr. Loughheed under the
Family Compensation Act, each fell within the meaning of “insured”
under the Regulations. Therefore, they said, each of them was
entitled to UMP coverage in the amount of $1 million, regardless of
the wording of the SEF 44 Endorsements.
Examining this argument, the judge turned to the grant of coverage
under Section 148.1(2) of the Regulations. It states,
Where death or injury of an insured is caused by an accident that
(a) arises out of the use of operation of a
vehicle by an
underinsured motorist …
the corporation shall, subject to subsections (1), (5) and (6)
and section 148..4, compensate the insured, or a person
who has a claim in respect of the death of the insured, for
any amount he is entitled to recover from the underinsured
motorist as damages for the injury or death.
The judge concluded that “he” in the phrase “any amount he is
entitled to recover” must refer to the injured or deceased insured.
Based on a plain reading of the statute, this reasoning appears to
be incorrect, as the phrasing of the section suggests “he” could
also refer to “a person who has a claim in respect of the death of
the insured”, meaning each insured person (including those entitled
to make Family Compensation Act claims) is entitled to the full
policy limit.
Notwithstanding the above, the decision in respect of the
applicable limit ultimately appears to be correct, as the court next
considered whether each of the claimants was entitled to bring an
action under the Family Compensation Act. The judge noted the
Family Compensation Act specifies in section 3(1) that an action
for the benefit of a spouse or child of a deceased must be brought
by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased.
Section 3(4) provides if there is no personal representative, the
action might be brought by and in the names of any of the persons
for whose benefit the action would have been if it had been brought
by the personal representative, but section 3(5) limits this by stating
that every action brought must be for the benefit of the same person
or persons as if it were brought in the name of the personal
representative. The judge ruled the upshot of all this was the
plaintiffs’ claims must be treated as though they were a single cause
of action brought on the plaintiffs’ behalf by Mr. Lougheed’s personal
representative. This meant a single shot at the policy limit.
In the result, the plaintiffs were collectively entitled to $1 million of
UMP coverage.
While perhaps obvious to many, it should also be noted that where
an accident results in more than one fatality, the result will be that
the family of each deceased party is entitled to $1 Million in UMP
coverage, as each fatally injured occupant of the vehicle will have
a separate personal representative, and therefore a separate cause
of action. The Mazur case should be of interest to all out-of-province
auto insurers, as the Power of Attorney and Undertaking (“PAU”)
filed by most US insurers will produce the same result as the
business authorizations issued to Citadel, Liberty and Co-operators.
(assuming that the PAU is in the newest form).
A link to the judgement can be found here:
http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/
05/13/2005bcsc1371.htm
A link to the December 22, 2004 Insurable Interest Bulletin can be
found at:
http://www.cwilson.com/insurance/
reviews/insrev92.shtml
Readers with questions regarding this case or other insurance topics
are invited to contact Glen Boswall (telephone: 604-643-3125 or e-mail:
rgb@cwilson.com) or
Jonathan Hodes (telephone: 643-3168 or e-mail:
jlh@cwilson.com) or any other member of Clark Wilson’s Insurance
Practice Group.