Clark Wilson LLP Insurance Bulletin
Case Law Review Archive
Intentional Torts of Employees: Are
Employers Covered or Not?
The Defence
Research Institute, a U.S.-based association of insurance counsel, publishes
a monthly magazine entitled "For the Defence" which occasionally presents
articles by prominent Canadian insurance lawyers. The most recent
edition of the magazine has published an article by Clark Wilson LLP's Neo
Tuytel, a copy of which follows.
As previously reported (Points North, August,
2000), the Supreme Court of Canada has recently followed the lead of most
United States courts in denying liability insurance coverage to alleged
perpetrators of sexual assaults. In its reasons in Scalera
and Sansalone (2000 SCC 24 & 25), the Court referred to U.S.
caselaw, including holdings denying coverage for allegations of negligence
which are “derivative” of an intentional sexual assualt.
The narrow issue addressed in this article
is whether Canadian jurisprudence would support a denial of coverage where,
for example, an employer is alleged to be vicariously liable for a sexual
or other assault perpetrated by one of its employees. Specifically,
is such liability “derivative” of an intentional tort, and therefore excluded?
In a word, the answer is “no”; at least
not yet.
Two of our leading appellate courts have
considered similar issues, one before and the other after the Supreme Court’s
reasons on no coverage for perpetrators of May 3, 2000.
The decisions of the British Columbia and
Ontario (roughly equivalent to California and New York) Courts of Appeal
both concerned non-sexual assaults. In Bluebird Cabs Ltd. v. Guardian
Insurance Co., [1999] B.C.J. No. 694, two taxi drivers were alleged
to have assaulted persons (presumably customers), on two separate occasions.
The drivers were sued, and the cab company was alleged to be vicariously
liable. In Godonoaga v. Khatambakhsh, [2000] O.J. No. 2172,
a minor was assaulted by a group of students. The mother of one student
sent another of her sons to join the assault. When the infant plaintiff
was carried to his home, the two students’ father followed, and interfered
with the calling of an ambulance. In addition to the two brothers,
their parents were sued, among other matters, for negligence in raising
their children without proper respect for others.
And you thought Canada was such a peaceful
country!
Each trial judge upheld denials of coverage
to the employer and parents, respectively, but both Courts of Appeal reversed.
In Godonoaga, the Ontario Court of Appeal directly addressed the
Supreme Court’s comments on “derivative” liability in Scalera and
Sansalone.
The Godonoaga court acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s use of
the term “derivative” was “problematic”. However,
“the sons could readily be held
liable for assault and the action in negligence against their parents dismissed.
In this sense the liability of the parents is not derivative of the claims
against their sons and cannot constitute a reason for denying them coverage
and a defence.”
Stated otherwise, Godonoaga was “not
a case where the plaintiff [had] attempted to “dress” the assaults [by
the sons] in the guise of a negligence suit” against their parents.
By logical extension, the same reasoning
should apply to claims against an employer for (ex.) negligent hiring,
training or supervision of an employee (i.e. such allegations would be
covered, but an alleged assault by an employee would be excluded).
But what of ‘pure’ vicarious liability?
Bluebird was decided before Scalera
and Sansalone, but squarely addressed coverage for vicarious liability.
The B.C. Court of Appeal noted that (unlike in Godonoaga) there
was no allegation of negligence by the non-perpetrator defendant, and then
considered the “extremely rich” body of academic literature on vicarious
liability. The Court noted that
“it is not the act of the wrongdoer
which is attributed to the employer, nor is it the fault or blame of the
wrongdoer that is attributed. It is the victim’s remedy against the
wrongdoer, namely liability for the wrong, which is attributed.”
It then held:
“In such a case, at least, where
the act that triggers liability is a wrongful and unauthorized action [ex.
assaulting a customer] in carrying out an authorized task [ex. driving
a taxi], it would be extremely unreasonable to attribute the unauthorized
acts to the employer or to attribute the fault for the unauthorized acts
to the employer. Surely, the correct view is that it is only the
liability itself which is attributed from the wrongdoing employee to the
non-blameworthy employer.”
The Court also referred to a “Separation of
Insureds” provision in the policy, as well as the “expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured” language of the relevant exclusion
clause. Clearly, neither the acts of the driver nor the injuries
to the customer were “expected or intended” by the taxi company.
The Godonoaga court went even further
on this point. There, the policy excluded “Bodily Injury or Property
Damage caused intentionally by or at your direction or resulting from your
criminal acts or omissions.” Following prior Ontario Court of Appeal
authority, the Court held that such wording was, at best, ambiguous, and
therefore had the same effect as the “Separation of Insureds” clause in
Bluebird.
The Godonoaga court did one more thing
of note. It had regard to the direct recourse provisions of the essentially
uniform Insurance Acts in Canada, whereby an injured party can pursue the
insurer of a tortfeasor against whom judgement has been obtained, if the
tortfeasor fails to satisfy the judgement. Specifically, the court
considered the statutory provision that any such claim would be “subject
to the same equities [ex. any exclusion clauses] as the insurer would have
if the judgement had been satisfied.”
The court then stated that it,
“[could] not accept the proposition
that [the victim’s mother, and litigation guardian] would be disentitled
from recovering a judgement in negligence against the parents of the boys
who injured her son because her claim is derivative of her son’s claim
against the boys themselves.”
The same reasoning would apply to a negligence
or vicarious liability claim against an employer and therefore its insurer.
All in all, as the Bluebird court
noted, it is irrelevant to coverage for an employer or other non-perpetrator
that the acts or injuries in question were expected or intended by someone
else. The Godonoaga court has since distinguished Scalera
and Sansalone, limiting the Supreme Court’s comments on “derivative”
claims to the facts of those cases, neither of which involved claims against
employers, parents, or other non-perpetrators of sexual assaults.
For a comprehensive discussion of these
issues, you are invited to review the paper Sexual
Misconduct Claims : A Primer for Insurers on Liability and Coverage
Issues Involving Sexual Assault, Abuse, and Harassment.
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and linking to the "Recent
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